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Abstract
Motivated by several classic decision-theoretic para-
doxes, and by analogies with the paradoxes which in
physics motivated the development of quantum me-
chanics, we introduce a projective generalization of ex-
pected utility along the lines of the quantum-mechanical
generalization of probability theory. The resulting de-
cision theory accommodates the dominant paradoxes,
while retaining significant simplicity and tractability. In
particular, every finite game within this larger class of
preferences still has an equilibrium.
Introduction
John von Neumann (1903-1957) is widely regarded as a
founding father of many fields, including game theory, deci-
sion theory, quantum mechanics and computer science. Two
of his contributions are of special importance in our context.
In 1932, von Neumann proposed the first rigorous founda-
tion for quantum mechanics, based on a calculus of projec-
tions in Hilbert spaces. In 1944, together with Oskar Mor-
genstern, he gave the first axiomatic foundation for the ex-
pected utility hypothesis (Bernoulli 1738). In both cases,
the frameworks he pioneered are still at the core of the re-
spective fields. In particular, the expected utility hypothesis
is still the de facto foundation of fields such as finance and
game theory.
The von Neumann - Morgenstern axiomatization of ex-
pected utility, and later on the subjective formulations by
Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) were im-
mediately greeted as simple and intuitively compelling. Yet,
in the course of time, a number of empirical violations and
paradoxes (Allais 1953, Ellsberg 1961, Rabin and Thaler
2001) came to cast doubt on the validity of the hypothesis
as a foundation for the theory of rational decisions in condi-
tions of risk and subjective uncertainty. In economics and in
the social sciences, the shortcomings of the expected utility
hypothesis are generally well known, but often tacitly ac-
cepted in view of the great tractability and usefulness of the
corresponding mathematical framework. In fact, the hypoth-
esis postulates that preferences can be represented by way
of a utility functional which is linear in probabilities, and
linearity makes expected utility representations particularly
tractable in models and applications.
The experimental paradoxes, which in the context of
physics motivated the introduction of quantum mechanics,
bear interesting relations with some of the decision-theoretic
paradoxes which came to challenge the status of expected
utility in the social sciences: in both cases, the anomalies can
be regarded as violations of an appropriately defined notion
of independence. In physics, quantum mechanics was intro-
duced as a tractable and empirically accurate mathematical
framework in the presence of such violations. In economics
and the social sciences, the importance of accounting for
violations of the expected utility hypothesis has long been
recognized, but so far none of its numerous alternatives has
emerged as dominant, sometimes due to a lack of mathemat-
ical tractability, or to the ad-hoc nature of some axiomatic
proposals. Motivated by these considerations, we would like
to introduce a decision-theoretic framework which accom-
modates the dominant paradoxes while retaining significant
simplicity and tractability. As we shall see, this is obtained
by weakening the expected utility hypothesis to its projec-
tive counterpart, in analogy with the quantum-mechanical
generalization of classical probability theory.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section
briefly reviews the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework.
Sections 3 and 4, respectively, present Allais’ and Ellsberg’s
paradoxes. Section 5 introduces a mathematical framework
for projective expected utility, and a representation result.
Section 6 contains a subjective formulation for projective ex-
pected utility, and a corresponding representation result. In
section 7 there is a brief discussion, and in sections 8 and 9,
respectively, we show how Allais’ and Ellsberg’s paradoxes
can be accommodated within the new framework. Section
10 discusses the multi-agent case and the issue of existence
of strategic equilibrium, while the last section concludes.
von Neumann - Morgenstern Expected Utility
Let S be a finite set of outcomes, and ∆ be the set of
probability functions defined on S, taken to represent risky
prospects (or lotteries). Next, let  be a complete and
transitive binary relation defined on ∆ × ∆, representing
a decision-maker’s preference ordering over lotteries. Indif-
ference of p, q ∈ ∆ is defined as [p  q and q  p] and
denoted as p ∼ q, while strict preference of p over q is de-
fined as [p  q and not q  p], and denoted by p ≻ q. The
preference ordering is assumed to satisfy the following two
conditions.
Axiom 1 (Archimedean) For all p, q, r ∈ ∆ with p ≻ q ≻ r,
there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αp + (1 − α)r ≻ q ≻
βp+ (1− β)r.
Axiom 2 (Independence) For all p, q, r ∈ ∆, p  q if, and
only if, αp+ (1− α)r  αq + (1− α)r for all α ∈ [0, 1].
A functional u : ∆ → R is said to represent  if, for all
p, q ∈ ∆, p  q if and only if u(p) ≥ u(q).
Theorem 1 (von Neumann and Morgenstern) Axioms 1 and
2 are jointly equivalent to the existence of a functional u :
∆→ R which represents  such that, for all p ∈ ∆,
u(p) =
∑
s∈S
u(s)p(s).
The von Neumann - Morgenstern setting is appropriate
whenever the nature of the uncertainty is purely objective:
all lotteries are associated to objective random devices, such
as dice or roulette wheels, with well-defined and known fre-
quencies for all outcomes, and the decision-maker only eval-
uates a lottery based on the frequencies of its outcomes.
The “Double-Slit Paradox” of Decision Theory
The following paradox is due to Allais (1953). First, please
choose between:
A: A chance of winning 4000 dollars with probability 0.2
(expected value 800 dollars)
B: A chance of winning 3000 dollars with probability 0.25
(expected value 750 dollars).
Next, please choose between:
C: A chance of winning 4000 dollars with probability 0.8
(expected value 3200 dollars)
B: A chance of winning 3000 dollars with certainty.
If you chose A over B, and D over C, then you are in the
modal class of respondents. The paradox lies in the observa-
tion that A and C are special cases of a two-stage lottery E
which in the first stage either returns zero dollars with prob-
ably (1−α) or, with probability α, it leads to a second stage
where one gets 4000 dollars with probability 0.8 and zero
otherwise. In particular, if α is set to 1 then E reduces to C,
and if α is set to 0.25 it reduces to A. Similarly, B and D
are special cases of a two-stage lottery F which again with
probability (1−α) returns zero, and with probability α con-
tinues to a second stage where one wins 3000 dollars with
probability 1. Again, if α = 1 then F reduces to D, and
if α = 0.25 it reduces to B. Then it is easy to see that the
[A ≻ B, D ≻ C] pattern violates Axiom 2 (Independence),
as E can be regarded as a lottery αp+ (1− α)r, and F as a
lottery αq+(1−α)r, where p and q represent lottery C and
D respectively and r represents the lottery in which one gets
zero dollars with certainty. When comparing E and F , why
should it matter what is the value of α? Yet, experimentally
one finds that it does.
Allais’ paradox bears a certain resemblance with the well-
known double-slit paradox in physics. Imagine cutting two
parallel slits in a sheet of cardboard, shining light through
them, and observing the resulting pattern as particles going
through the two slits scatter on a wall behind the cardboard
barrier. Experimentally, one finds that when both slits are
open, the overall scattering pattern is not the sum of the two
scattering patterns produced when one slit is open and the
other closed. The effect does not go away even if particles
of light are shone one by one, and this is paradoxical: why
should it matter to an individual particle which happens to
go through the left slit, when determining where to scatter
later on, with what probability it could have gone through
the right slit instead? In a sense, each particle in the double-
slit experiment behaves like a decision-maker who violates
the Independence axiom in Allais’ experiment.
Ellsberg’s Paradox
Another disturbing violation of the expected utility hypoth-
esis was pointed out by Ellsberg (1961). Suppose that a box
contains 300 balls of three possible colors: red (R), green
(G), and blue (B). You know that the box contains exactly
100 red balls, but are given no information on the proportion
of green and blue.
You win if you guess which color will be drawn. Do you
prefer to bet on red (R) or on green (G)? Many respondents
choose R, on grounds that the probability of drawing a red
ball is known to be 1/3, while the only information on the
probability of drawing a green ball is that it is between 0 and
2/3. Now suppose that you win if you guess which color
will not be drawn. Do you prefer to bet that red will not
be drawn (R) or that green will not be drawn (G)? Again
many respondents prefer to bet on R, as the probability is
known (2/3) while the probability of G is only known to be
between 1 and 1/3.
The pattern [R ≻ G, R ≻ G] is incompatible with von
Neumann - Morgenstern expected utility, which only deals
with known probabilities, and is also incompatible with the
Savage (1954) formulation of expected utility with subjec-
tive probability as it violates its Sure Thing axiom. The
paradox suggests that, in order to account for such patterns
of choice, subjective uncertainty and risk should be handled
as distinct notions. Once again, the issue bears interesting
relations with quantum mechanics, where the need to keep
a distinction between subject-related uncertainty and objec-
tive risk also presented itself, and is naturally met in the for-
malism by the distinction between pure and mixed states.
Projective Expected Utility
Let X be the positive orthant of the unit sphere in Rn,
where n is the cardinality of the set of relevant outcomes
S := {s1, s2, ..., sn} . Then von Neumann - Morgenstern
lotteries, regarded as elements of the unit simplex, are in
one-to-one correspondence with elements of X, which can
therefore be interpreted as risky prospects, for which the fre-
quencies of the relevant outcomes are fully known. Observe
that, while the projections of elements of the unit simplex
(and hence, L1 unit vectors) on the basis vectors can be nat-
urally associated with probabilities, if we choose to model
von Neumann - Morgenstern lotteries as elements of the unit
sphere (and hence, as unit vectors in L2) then probabilities
are naturally associated with squared projections. The ad-
vantage of such move is thatL2 is the onlyLp space which is
also a Hilbert space, and Hilbert spaces have a very tractable
projective structure which is exploited by the representation.
In particular, it is unique to L2 that the set of unit vectors is
invariant with respect to projections.
Next, let 〈.|.〉 denote the usual inner product in Rn. An
orthonormal basis is a set of unit vectors (b1, ..., bn) such
that 〈bi|bj〉 = 0 whenever i 6= j. The natural basis corre-
sponds to the set of degenerate lotteries returning each ob-
jective lottery outcome with certainty, and is conveniently
identified with the set of objective lottery outcomes. Yet,
in any realistic experimental setting, it is very unlikely that
those objective outcomes will happen to coincide with the
relevant outcomes as subjectively perceived by the decision-
maker. Moreover, even if those could be fully elicited, it
would be generally problematic to relate a von Neumann-
Morgenstern lottery, which only specifies the probabilities
of the objective outcomes, with the decision-relevant proba-
bilities induced on the subjective outcomes. The perspective
of the observer or modeller is inesorably bound to objec-
tively measurable entities, such as frequencies and prizes;
by contrast, the decision-maker thinks and acts based on
subjective preferences and subjective outcomes, which in
a revealed-preference context should be presumed to exist
while at the same time assumed, as a methodological princi-
ple, to be unaccessible to direct measurement.
Axiom 3 (Born’s Rule) There exists an orthonormal basis
(z1, ..., zn) such that, for all x ∈ X and all si ∈ S, any two
lotteries are indifferent whenever their risk profiles
px(zi) = 〈x|zi〉2 , i = 1, . . . , n
coincide.
Axiom 3 requires that there exist an interpretation of ele-
ments of X in terms of the relevant dimensions of risk as
perceived by the decision-maker. In the von Neumann -
Morgenstern treatment, Axiom 3 is tacitly assumed to hold
with respect to the natural basis in Rn. This implicit assump-
tion amounts to the requirement that lotteries are only eval-
uated based on the probabilities they induce on the objective
lottery outcomes.
By contrast, the preferred basis postulated in Axiom 3 is
allowed to vary across different decision-makers, capturing
the idea that the relevant dimensions of risk (that is, those
pertaining to the actual subjective consequences) may be
perceived differently by different subjects, perhaps due to
portfolio effects, while the natural basis may be taken to
represent the relevant dimensions of risk as perceived by
the modeler or an external observer (that is, in terms of the
objective outcomes as evaluated by the observer). Portfo-
lio effects are very difficult to exclude in an experimental
setting. For instance, the very fact of proposing to a sub-
ject the Allais or Ellsberg games described above generates
an expectation of gain. An invitation to play the game can
be effectively regarded as a risky security which is donated
to the subject, and whose subjective returns are obviously
correlated, but do not necessarily coincide, with the mone-
tary outcomes of the experiment. Even in such simple con-
texts, significant hedging behavior cannot be in principle ex-
cluded.
In our context, orthogonality captures the idea that two
events or outcomes are mutually exclusive (for one event to
have probability one, the other must have probability zero).
The preferred basis captures which, among all possible ways
to partition the relevant uncertainty into a set of mutually ex-
clusive events or outcomes, leads to a set of payoff-relevant
orthogonal lotteries from which preferences on all other lot-
teries can be assigned in a linear fashion. In particular, the
basis elements must span the whole range of preferences.
For instance, in case a decision-maker is indifferent between
two outcomes, but strictly prefers to receive both of them
with equal frequency, preferences on the two outcomes do
not span all the relevant range; therefore, this preference
pattern cannot be captured in the natural basis, and hence in
von Neumann - Morgenstern expected utility. Axiom 3 pos-
tulates that each lottery is evaluated by the decision maker
solely by the uncertainty it induces on appropriately chosen
payoff-relevant dimensions. For now, and only for simplic-
ity, we assume that the cardinality of the set of subjective
outcomes coincides with that of the objective ones; we relax
this assumption later on, in the subjective formulation.
Once an orthonormal basis Z is given, each objective lot-
tery x uniquely corresponds to a function px : Z → [0, 1],
such that px(zi) = 〈x|zi〉2 for all zi ∈ Z. Let B be the set
of all such risk profiles px, for x ∈ X, and let be the com-
plete and transitive preference ordering induced on B × B
by preferences on the underlying lotteries. We postulate the
following two axioms, which mirror those in the von Neu-
mann - Morgenstern treatment.
Axiom 4 (Archimedean) For all x, y, z ∈ X with p(x) ≻
p(y) ≻ p(z), there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αp(x) +
(1− α)p(z) ≻ p(y) ≻ βp(x) + (1− β)p(z).
Axiom 5 (Independence) For all x, y, z ∈ X , px  py if,
and only if, αpx + (1 − α)pz  apy + (1 − α)pz for all
α ∈ [0, 1].
Observe that the two axioms impose conditions solely on
risk profiles, and not on the underlying lotteries. In particu-
lar, note that a convex combination αpx +(1−α)py , where
px and py are objective probability functions, is also an ob-
jective probability function. Hence, the type of mixing in
Axioms 4 and 5 can be regarded as objective, while subjec-
tive mixing will be later on captured by convex combinations
(in Rn) of the underlying (Anscombe-Aumann) acts.
Theorem 2 Axioms 3-5 are jointly equivalent to the exis-
tence of a symmetric matrix U such that u(x) := x′Ux for
all x ∈ X represents .
Proof. Assume that Axiom 3 holds with respect to a given
orthonormal basis (z1, , zn). By the von Neumann - Mor-
genstern result (which applies to any convex mixture set,
such as B) Axioms 4 and 5 are jointly equivalent to the ex-
istence of a functional u which represents the ordering and
is linear in p, i.e.
u(x) =
n∑
i=1
u(si)psi(x) =
n∑
i=1
u(si) 〈x|zi〉2 ,
where the second equality is by definition of p as squared
inner product with respect to the preferred basis. The above
can be equivalently written, in matrix form, as
u(x) = x′P ′DPx = x′Ux,
where D is the diagonal matrix with the payoffs on the main
diagonal, P is the projection matrix associated to (z1, , zn),
and U := P ′DP is symmetric. Conversely, by the Spectral
Decomposition theorem, for any symmetric matrix U there
exist a diagonal matrix D and a projection matrix P such
that U = P ′DP , and hence
x′Ux = x′P ′DPx
for all x ∈ X. But this is just expected utility with respect
to the orthonormal basis defined by P . Hence, the three
axioms are jointly equivalent to the existence of a symmetric
matrix U such that u(x) := x′Ux represents the preference
ordering. QED
Subjective Formulation
We introduce the following setup and notation.
S is a finite set of states of Nature.
〈.|.〉 denotes the usual inner product in Euclidean space.
Ω is the natural basis in Rn, identified with a finite set
{ω1, . . . ., ωn} of lottery outcomes (prizes).
Z is an orthonormal basis in Rm, with m ≥ n, identi-
fied with a finite set of subjective outcomes or consequences
{z1, . . . ., zm}. V is an arbitrary (m × n) matrix chosen so
that, for all ωi in Ω, V ωi is a unit vector in Rm.
The quantity
〈
zj|V ωi〉2 is interpreted as p(zj|ωi), the
conditional probability of subjective outcome zj given ob-
jective outcome ωi.
Lotteries correspond to L2 unit vectors x ∈ Rn+; X is the
set of all lotteries.
Since Ω is the natural basis, 〈ωi|x〉2 = x2i ; this quantity
is interpreted as p(ωi|x).
Once the subjective consequences zj are specified, for
any lottery x one can readily compute p(ωi|x) = x2i
and p(zj |x) = ∑i p(ωi|x)p(zj |ωi) =
∑
i x
2
i
〈
zj|V ωi〉2.
Moreover, given the latter probabilistic constraints, one can
readily identify the unique lottery x and an orthonormal ba-
sis Z which jointly satisfy them. Hence, in the above con-
struction lotteries are identified with respect to two different
frames of reference: objective lottery outcomes, and subjec-
tive consequences.
An act is identified with a function f : S → X . H is the
set of all acts.
∆(X) is the (nonempty, closed and convex) set of all
probability functions on Z induced by lotteries in X .
M is the set of all vectors (ps)s∈S , with ps ∈ ∆(X).
For each f ∈ H a corresponding risk profile pf ∈
M is defined, for all s ∈ S and all zj ∈ Z, by
pfs (z
j) :=
〈
zj|V fs〉2 . Observe that, even though pfs is a
well-defined probability function, pfs (zj) generally differs
from the probability of zj given f(s), which is given by∑
i fi(s)
2
〈
zj|V ωi〉2. Hence, except when the two mea-
sures happen to coincide, the risk profile pf cannot be inter-
preted as a vector of objective probabilities, but rather as a
possible sufficient statistic for the ranking of acts from the
point of view of the decision-maker.
As customary, we assume that the decision-makers pref-
erences are characterized by a rational (i.e., complete and
transitive) preference ordering on acts.
Next, we proceed with the following assumptions, which
mirror those in Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
Axiom 6 (Projective) There exists an orthonormal basis Z
such that any two acts f, g ∈ H are indifferent if pf = pg.
In Anscombe and Aumann’s setting, the above axiom is
implicitly assumed to hold with Z ≡ Ω and V ≡ I , where
I is the (n × n) identity matrix. Because of Axiom 6,
preferences on acts can be equivalently expressed as pref-
erences on risk profiles. For all pf , pg ∈ M , we stipulate
that pf  pg if and only if f  g.
Axiom 7 (Archimedean) If pf , pg, ph ∈ M are such that
pf ≻ pg ≻ ph, then there exist a, b ∈ (0, 1) such that apf +
(1− a)ph ≻ pg ≻ bpf + (1 − b)ph.
Axiom 8 (Independence) For all pf , pg, ph ∈ M , and for
all a ∈ (0, 1], pf ≻ pg if and only if apf + (1 − a)ph ≻
apg + (1− a)ph.
Axiom 9 (Non-degeneracy) There exist pf , pg ∈ M such
that pf ≻ pg.
Axiom 10 (State independence) Let s, t ∈ S be non-null
states, and let p, q ∈ ∆(X). Then, for any pf ∈M ,
(pf1 , ..., p
f
s−1, p, p
f
s+1, ..., p
f
n) ≻
(pf1 , ..., p
f
s−1, q, p
f
s+1, ..., p
f
n)
if, and only if,
(pf1 , ..., p
f
t−1, p, p
f
t+1, ..., p
f
n) ≻
(pf
1
, ..., pft−1, q, p
f
t+1, ..., p
f
n).
Theorem 3 (Anscombe and Aumann) The preference rela-
tion  fulfills Axioms 6 − 10 if and only if there is a unique
probability measure pi on S and a non-constant function
u : X → R (unique up to positive affine rescaling) such
that, for any f, g ∈ H, f  g if and only if∑
s∈S pi(s)
∑
zi∈Z p
f
s (z
i)u(zi) ≥∑
s∈S pi(s)
∑
zi∈Z p
g
s(z
i)u(zi).
Theorem 4 The preference relation  fulfills Axioms 6 −
10 if and only if there is a unique probability measure pi
on S and a symmetric (n × n) matrix U with non-constant
eigenvalues such that, for any f, g ∈ H, f  g if and only if∑
s∈S pi(s)f
′
sUfs ≥
∑
s∈S pi(s)g
′
sUgs.
Proof. Let D be the (m × m) diagonal matrix defined
by Di,i = u(zi), and let P be the projection matrix de-
fined by (Pi,.)′ = zi. If Axioms 6-10 hold, we know from
Theorem 3 that the preference ordering has an expected
utility representation. Observe that, since (PV fs)2i =
〈 zi|V fs〉2 = pf
s
(zi),
∑
s∈S pi(s)
∑
zi∈Z p
f
s (z
i)u(zi) =∑
s∈S pi(s)f
′
sV
′P ′DPV fs.
It follows that the expected utility of any act f can be
written as
∑
s∈S pi(s)f
′
sUfs, where U := V ′P ′DPV is a
(n×n) symmetric matrix. Since the diagonal elements ofD
are the eigenvalues of U, the latter matrix has non-constant
eigenvalues.
Conversely, let U be a symmetric (n × n) matrix with
non-constant eigenvalues. By the Spectral Decomposi-
tion theorem there exist a projection matrix P and a di-
agonal matrix D such that U = V ′P ′DPV, and there-
fore
∑
s∈S pi(s)f
′
sUfs=
∑
s∈S pi(s)f
′
sV
′P ′DPV fs. Ob-
serve that the right-hand side is the expected utility of f with
respect to the orthonormal basis Z defined by zi = P ′i,.,and
with u(zi) = Di,i. Since the diagonal elements of D are
the eigenvalues of U, if the latter has non-constant eigenval-
ues then u(zi) is also non-constant, and hence by Theorem
3 Axioms 6-10 must hold. QED
The above formulation extends the representation to sit-
uations of subjective uncertainty. Say that an act is pure
or certain if it returns for sure a given objective lottery,
and mixed or uncertain if it can be obtained as the con-
vex combination αf + (1− α)g of two non-identical acts f
and g.
Properties of the Representation
Our representation generalizes the Anscombe-Aumann ex-
pected utility framework in three directions. First, subjective
uncertainty (from mixed acts) and risk (from pure acts) are
treated as distinct notions. Second, as we shall see, within
this class of preferences both Allais’ and Ellsberg’s para-
doxes are accommodated. Finally, the construction easily
extends to the complex unit sphere, provided that 〈x|y〉2 is
replaced by | 〈x|y〉 |2 in the definition of p, in which case
Theorems 2 and 4 hold with respect to a Hermitian (rather
than symmetric) payoff matrix U , and the result also pro-
vides axiomatic foundations for decisions involving quan-
tum uncertainty.
Let ei, ej be the degenerate lotteries assigning probability
1 to outcomes si and sj , respectively, and let ei,j be the
lottery assigning probability 1/2 to each of the two states.
Observe that, for any two distinct si and sj ,
Uij = u(ei,j)− (1
2
u(ei) +
1
2
u(ej)).
It follows that the off-diagonal entryUij in the payoff matrix
can be interpreted as the discount, or premium, attached to
an equiprobable combination of the two outcomes with re-
spect to its expected utility base-line, and hence as a measure
of preference for risk versus uncertainty along the specific
dimension involving outcomes si and sj .
Observe that the functional in Theorem 2 is quadratic in
x, but linear in p. If U is diagonal, then its eigenvalues coin-
cide with the diagonal elements. In von Neumann - Morgen-
stern expected utility, those eigenvalues contain all the rel-
evant information about the decision-maker’s risk attitudes.
In our framework, risk attitudes are jointly captured by both
the diagonal and non-diagonal elements of U , which are
completely characterized by a diagonal matrix D with the
eigenvalues of U on the main diagonal and a projection ma-
trix P. Furthermore, in our setting attitudes towards uncer-
tainty are captured by the concavity or convexity (in x) of the
quadratic form x′Ux, and therefore, ultimately, by the defi-
niteness condition of U and the sign of its eigenvalues. Con-
vexity corresponds to the case of all positive eigenvalues,
and captures the idea that risk is ceteris paribus preferred to
uncertainty, while concavity corresponds to the case of all
negative eigenvalues and captures the opposite idea.
Example: Objective Uncertainty
Figure 1 below presents several examples of indifference
maps on pure lotteries which can be obtained within our
class of preferences for different choices of U .
Figure 1: Examples of indifference maps on the probability
triangle
The first pattern (parallel straight lines) characterizes von
Neumann - Morgenstern expected utility. Within our class
of representations, it corresponds to the special case of a
diagonal payoff matrix U. All other patterns are impossible
within von Neumann - Morgenstern expected utility.
The representation is sufficiently general to accommodate
Allais’ paradox from section 3. In the context of the exam-
ple in section 3, let {s1, s2, s3} be the states in which 4000,
3000, and 0 dollars are won, respectively. To accommodate
Allais’ paradox, assume a slight aversion to the risk of ob-
taining no gain (s3):
U =
s1
s2
s3
s1
13
0
−1
s2
0
10
−1
s3
−1
−1
0
Let the four lotteries A, B, C, D be defined, respectively,
as the following unit vectors in S+: a = (
√
0.2, 0,
√
0.8);
b = (0,
√
0.25,
√
0.75); c = (
√
0.8, 0,
√
0.2); d = (0, 1, 0).
Then lottery A is preferred to B, while D is preferred to C,
as
u(a) = a′Ua = 1.8,
u(b) = b′Ub = 1.634,
u(c) = c′Uc = 9.6,
u(d) = d′Ud = 10.
Example: Subjective Uncertainty
In the Ellsberg puzzle, suppose that either all the non-red
balls are green (R = 100, G = 200, B = 0), or they are
all blue (R = 100, G = 0, B = 200), with equal subjective
probability. Further, suppose that there are just two payoff-
relevant outcomes, Win and Lose. Then the following spec-
ification of the payoff matrix accommodates the paradox.
U = Win
Lose
Win
1
α
Lose
α
0
As we shall see, if α = 0 we are in the expected utility
case, where the decision-maker is indifferent between risk
and uncertainty; when α > 0, risk is preferred to uncer-
tainty; and when α < 0, the decision-maker prefers uncer-
tainty to risk.
In fact, let {Urn1, Urn2} be the set of possible states of
nature, with uniform subjective probability, and let
r = (
√
1/3,
√
2/3),
r = (
√
2/3,
√
1/3)
be the lotteries representing R and R, respectively. Fur-
thermore, let
w = (1, 0),
l = (0, 1)
be the lotteries corresponding to a sure win and a sure
loss, respectively.
The mixed acts G and G have projective expected utilities
given by
u(G) = p(Urn1)u(r)+p(Urn2)u(l),
u(G¯) = p(Urn1)u(r)+p(Urn2)u(w).
One also has that
u(w) = 1,
u(l) = 0,
u(r) = r′Ur = 1/3 + α
√
8/3,
u(r) = r′Ur = 2/3 + α
√
8/3,
and therefore
u(g) = 1/3 + α
√
2/3
u(g) = 2/3 + α
√
2/3.
It follows that, whenever α > 0, R is preferred to G and
R to G¯, so the paradox is accommodated. When α < 0,the
opposite pattern emerges: G is preferred to R and G¯ to R.
Finally, when α = 0 the decision-maker is indifferent be-
tween R and G, and between R and G¯.
Multi-Agent Decisions and Equilibrium
Within the class of preferences characterized by Theorem 4,
is it still true that every finite game has a Nash equilibrium?
If the payoff matrix U is diagonal we are in the classical
case, so we know that any finite game has an equilibrium,
which moreover only involves objective risk (in our terms,
this type of equilibrium should be referred to as “pure”, as
it involves no subjective uncertainty). For the general case,
consider that u(f) is still continuous and linear with respect
to the subjective beliefs pi, while possibly nonlinear with re-
spect to risk. Therefore, all the necessary steps in Nash’s
proof (showing that the best response correspondence is
non-empty, convex-valued and upper-hemicontinuous in or-
der to apply Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem) also follow in
our case. Hence, any finite game has an equilibrium even
within this larger class of preferences, although the equilib-
rium may not be pure (in our sense): in general, an equilib-
rium will rest on a combination of objective randomization
and subjective uncertainty about other players’ decisions.
Conclusions
We presented a projective generalization of expected utility,
and showed that it can accommodate the dominant decision-
theoretic paradoxes. Whereas other generalizations of ex-
pected utility are typically non-linear in probabilities, pro-
jective expected utility is possibly nonlinear with respect to
risk, but linear with respect to subject-related uncertainty.
We found that within this class of preferences the dominant
paradoxes can be accommodated, and every finite game still
has an equilibrium. Moreover, the projective calculus asso-
ciated with the representation should make it generally quite
tractable in applications.
Our generalization of expected utility is closest to the one
in Gyntelberg and Hansen (2004), which is obtained in a
Savage context by postulating a non-classical (that is, non-
Boolean) structure for the relevant events. By contrast, our
representation is obtained in an Anscombe-Aumann context,
and does not impose specific requirements on the nature of
the relevant uncertainty. In particular, in our context the
dominant paradoxes can be resolved even if the relevant un-
certainty is of completely classical nature. Furthermore, in
case the event space is non-classical, our result also provides
foundations for decisions involving quantum uncertainty.
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